The Great Detour by Skott, Peter
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics
2010
The Great Detour
Peter Skott
University of Massachusetts Amherst, pskott@econs.umass.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Skott, Peter, "The Great Detour" (2010). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 102.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/102
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
 
 
The Great Detour 
 
 
By 
 
Peter Skott 
 
 
Working Paper 2010‐07 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST
The Great Detour 
 
 
 Peter Skott 
12/18/2009 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This note comments on the state of macroeconomics, arguing that the ‘micro 
founded’ macro that developed after 1970s has been a wasteful detour. The 
paper will appear in a symposium in Homo Oeconomicus, vol.  27 (2), 2010, 
on the crisis and the response from the British Academy to the questions from 
the British Queen. 
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By the beginning of the 2000s, a self-congratulatory consensus had taken hold 
among macroeconomists. According to Blanchard (2000, p. 1375) "progress in 
macroeconomics may well be the success story of twentieth century 
economics", and Blanchard (2008) maintained that "the state of macro is 
good". There had, he argued "been enormous progress and substantial 
convergence" and "a largely shared vision of both of fluctuations and of 
methodology has emerged".1  Woodford (1999) also saw convergence, not just 
within macroeconomics but also in relation to the rest of economics: "modern 
macroeconomic models are intertemporal general equilibrium models derived 
from the same foundations of optimizing behavior on the part of households 
and firms as are employed in other branches of economics" (p. 31). This 
position was echoed by Chari and Kehoe (2006) who claimed that 
"macroeconomics is now firmly grounded in the principles of economic 
theory" (p.3) and that this theoretical advance had great practical value: 
"macroeconomic theory has had a profound and farreaching effect on the 
institutions and practices governing monetary policy and is beginning to have a 
similar effect on fiscal policy. The marginal social product of macroeconomic 
science is surely large and growing rapidly" (p.26). 
The 'great moderation' and a dynamic American economy formed the 
background to this broadly shared sentiment. Business fluctuations had 
become milder and fast US growth demonstrated the powerful forces of free 
markets and a sensible economic policy with a focus on low inflation, 
economic incentives and liberalization. Historically the US performance during 
the neo-liberal era was not, in fact, particularly successful. Average growth 
rates were higher in 1950-1975, and the distribution of the gains was highly 
unequal during the neoliberal period: the rich (and especially the super rich) 
got richer while the median income of a male worker was unchanged between 
                                                            
1  The subsequent analysis shows a certain internal tension in his views. The new Keynesian model is 
described as a "toy model" that "lacks many of the details which might be needed to understand 
fluctuations". For a model that had already "become a workhorse for policy and welfare analysis" this 
assessment is not very reassuring. 
  
1973 and 2007. But memories are short and most macroeconomists give little 
weight to distributional issues. 
There are signs that the complacency within macroeconomics will be shattered 
by the financial crisis and the severe recession that hit most countries in 2008. 
Changes in the academic world can be slow -- one retirement at a time -- but 
the letter from the British Academy to the queen with its admission of "wishful 
thinking", "psychology of denial" and the "failure of the collective imagination 
of many bright people" can be seen as an indication of change, and increasing 
criticism has also come from within macroeconomics. 
Outside the mainstream, post Keynesian and institutionalist critics have always 
been scathing in their critique. As a relatively mild example, Dutt and Skott 
(2006) argued that "what has happened in macroeconomics since the late 1960s 
has been a wasteful detour.  A generation of macroeconomists has grown up 
learning tools that may be sophisticated, but the usefulness of these tools is 
questionable. Moreover, a great deal of damage may be, and has been, done 
when the tools are applied to real-world situations." Similar conclusions have 
now been reached by an increasing number of economists who were previously 
seen as part of the mainstream. Paul Krugman is quoted as saying that most of 
modern macroeconomics is "spectacularly useless at best, and positively 
harmful at worst" (Economist, 16 July 2009); Willem Buiter (2009) refers to 
the last 30 years of macroeconomics training at US and UK universities as a 
"costly waste of time"; Brad DeLong (2009) talks of the Chicago school's 
"intellectual collapse", and Robert Gordon (2009) wants to see 
macroeconomists retrained in "1978-era macroeconomics". 
The key element of the new macroeconomics is an emphasis on rigorous and 
explicit microeconomic foundations. Older style Keynesian macroeconomics, 
it was claimed, had failed in this respect, and the Lucas critique demonstrated 
the implications of this failure: reliable predictions required that analysis be 
based on structurally invariant factors, and for economists that meant 
preferences and production functions. 
Microeconomic behavior and the influence of expectations should clearly be 
taken seriously. No Keynesian will disagree with that. After all, about 90 
percent of the General Theory consists of detailed discussions of 
microeconomic behavior in a world of uncertainty, and the crucial role of 
expectations has always been emphasized by Keynesians. But the importance 
of microeconomic behavior does not mean that macroeconomic equations must 
be derived directly from the intertemporal utility maximization of a 
representative agent with perfect foresight (or rational expectations). A good 
behavioral story is required, but the so-called microfoundations of new macro 
are mechanical, primitive and misleading. 
The problems are largely well-known. Aggregation is one of them. Even if 
individual preferences can be taken as well-defined, exogenous and stable over 
time, the celebrated Sonnenschein-Debreu results show that microeconomic 
rationality imposes only very weak constraints on the properties of aggregate 
excess demand functions. Thus, the derivation of macroeconomic relations 
from the optimization of a representative household "is not simply an 
analytical convenience as often explained, but is both unjustified and leads to 
conclusions which are usually misleading and often wrong" (Kirman, 1992, p. 
117). 
The prototype models of new macro effectively abandoned the concerns that 
defined traditional macro. "New Keynesian" versions of new macro may 
include non-clearing labor markets and allow for real effects of aggregate 
demand policy. But it is assumed that in the absence of shocks, the economy 
converges to a structurally determined NAIRU, and cyclical fluctuations are 
generated by introducing stochastic shocks into models with a stable 
equilibrium solution. If only prices and wages were flexible, there would be no 
Keynesian problems of effective demand. It is not just that new macro gives 
another answer to old questions; new macro has stopped asking some of the 
main questions. 
The coordination and stability problems that were at the heart of 
macroeconomics (and of Keynes's message) have been forgotten, and this 
implicit dismissal of stability concerns cannot be justified by reference to 
Walrasian general equilibrium theory. In fact, the realization that stability had 
not and probably could not be established under reasonable assumptions may 
have been a critical factor behind the virtual abandonment in microeconomics 
of all research on Walrasian general equilibrium theory. 
Is there a New Keynesian answer to the stability concerns? Not really. Stability 
is simply assumed. The models typically involve saddlepoints and jump 
variables, and the presumption of stability is used to pin down the outcome in 
the short run. Agents have rational expectations, and the jump variables seek 
out the stable saddlepath. 
Rational expectations have been used before Muth and Lucas, although 
without using that name. Harrod's 'warranted growth path' represents a rational 
expectations path, but the extension of rational expectations to all models, not 
just steady growth paths or Robinsonian mythical ages, lacks both theoretical 
and empirical foundations. Systematic deviations of outcomes from 
expectations may lead to changes in expectation formation -- and shifts of this 
kind may be an source of instability, as suggested by the role of `animal spirits' 
in Keynesian analyses -- but the possibility of endogenous changes in 
expectation formation does not justify a focus on rational expectations. It is 
difficult to get convergence to rational expectations even in simple models of 
rational learning, and the real-world learning process takes place within a 
complex overall environment and one that is subject to constant and profound 
technical and institutional change. Indeed, institutional or structural change is 
often invoked to justify expectations that would otherwise seem unreasonable, 
viz. the appeal to a `new economy' during the stock market boom of the 1990s 
and the faith in financial engineering in the early 2000s. 
It is sometimes claimed that no one predicted the crisis and the end of the great 
moderation. This claim may be questionable, even if one confines attention to 
economists within the mainstream. But more importantly, the claim is 
testimony to how isolated and marginalized the heterodox tradition in 
economics has become. Minsky may be grudgingly referred to these days as 
someone with important insights on the instability of financial systems and 
their interaction with the real economy. But a long tradition in heterodox 
economics has emphasized the instability problems and crisis tendencies in 
unregulated market systems. The process of "financialization" figured 
prominently in some of this literature and the implications and sustainability of 
this process was the subject of intense debate.2 
These heterodox traditions were marginalized in the profession. There may be 
many reasons for that. The mainstream will see it as a reflection of weaknesses 
in the heterodox position rather than as an indication of the close-mindedness 
of the mainstream itself. In the words of the Economist (16 July 2009, "What 
went wrong with economics"), "[t]oday's economists tend to be open-minded 
about content, but doctrinaire about form. They are more wedded to their 
techniques than to their theories. They will believe something when they can 
model it". 
There is some truth in this claim. But the distinction between content and 
modeling technique breaks down in the case of macroeconomics. It is 
reasonable to demand that an argument be clearly articulated, logically 
coherent and consistent with relevant empirical evidence, but the prevailing 
orthodoxy in macroeconomics asked for something different. The call for 
microfoundations was interpreted as an imperative for all macro models to be 
based on full intertemporal optimization. It is precisely this imperative that has 
been challenged by both the old critics (including Keynesians like Tobin and 
Solow as well as heterodox economists) and the more recent strand of 
behavioral economics which, -- drawing on work from outside economics -- 
has pointed out systematic departures from the standard presumption of 
rational economic behavior. 
The problems with the new macroeconomics do not derive from "too much 
mathematics" or from the need for aggregation. All useful models represent 
drastically stylized pictures of a complex reality and all macro theory needs to 
work with aggregates. But the straightjacket of full intertemporal optimization 
misrepresents real-world decision making. It also reduces the ability of the 
theory to incorporate important aspects of reality in a tractable manner, and 
therefore encourages the theorist to ignore them. If one insists on rigorous 
intertemporal optimization as the basis of any macro relation then 
                                                            
2   See, among others, Palley (2007), Crotty (2005) and Epstein (2005); formalizations of Minsky type 
mechanisms include Taylor and O'Connell (1985), Foley (1986), Skott (1994) and Ryoo (2009). More general, 
Keynesian inspired theories of instability and endogenous cycles include Skott (1989) and Chiarella et al. 
(2005). 
simplifications need to be made in other areas in order to keep the model 
tractable. Thus, over the last 30 years macroeconomists have struggled to solve 
problems of intertemporal optimization. These optimization problems grossly 
simplify real-world decision problems, and the astounding implicit 
presumption has been that agents in the real world solve (or act as if they had 
solved) these much more complex problems. The neglect of aggregation 
problem and the use of representative agents in models that purport to provide 
microeconomic foundations only serve to make the picture even more bizarre. 
In fact, the new macro with its sophisticated and perfectly rational 
representative agents would seem to embody a good example of how not to use 
mathematics: mathematical models arguably are useful primarily because they 
allow a clear analysis of complex interactions between agents, each of whom 
may follow relatively simple (but possibly changing) behavioral rules. 
Macroeconomics is about the interactions across sectors and markets, and it 
has to address the stability and coordination problems that can arise from these 
interactions. It also needs behavioral foundations, but aggregation must be 
taken seriously and it should be recognized that bounded rationality and 
uncertainty characterize real-world decision-making. The "micro founded" 
macro that developed since the 1970s has been a wasteful detour. 
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